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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 9-103 OF THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNMENTAL
EMPLOYEES TORT IMMUNITY ACT.
INTRODUCTION
In Illinois, the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort
Immunity Act' governs the liability of local public entities and their employ-
ees. A key provision of the Act, section 9-103(b), 2 has been subject to con-
fused interpretation and much litigation. The difficulty is with the meaning
and operative effect of the words:
every policy for insurance . . .shall provide . . . that the com-
pany issuing such policy waives . . .any right to refuse payment
or to deny liability . by reason of the defenses and immunities
provided in this Act.
3
The question posed is whether the purchase of liability insurance by a
local public entity constitutes a waiver of the entity's defenses and immuni-
ties provided by the Act? Further and contrary to prior appellate court de-
cisions interpreting section 9-103(b), 4 a recent Illinois Supreme Court case,
Housewright v. City of LaHarpe,5 held "that the failure to give notice in ac-
cordance with section 8-102 is subject to the waiver provision of section 9-
103(b;."
The Housewright decision represents a significant change from the prior
law of local governmental tort immunity. The immediate effect is that an
uninsured local public entity can raise the defenses and immunities provided
in the Act, while an insured local public entity waives the right to raise
1. Il. Rev. Stat. ch. 85, §§ 1-101 et seq. (1971) [hereinafter cited as the Tort
Immunity Act or the Act.]
2. Il1. Rev. Stat. ch. 85, § 9-103 (1971):
(a) A local public entity may contract for insurance against any loss or
liability which may be imposed upon it under this Act. Such insurance shall
be carried with a company authorized by the Department of Insurance to write
such coverage in Illinois. The expenditure of funds of the local public entity
to purchase insurance is proper for any local public entity. (b) Every policy
for insurance coverage issued to a local public entity shall provide or be in-
dorsed to provide that the company issuing such policy waives any right to
refuse payment or to deny liability thereto within the limits of said policy
by reason of the non-liability of the insured public entity for the wrongful or
negligent acts of itself or its employees and its immunity from suit by reason
of the defenses and immunities provided in this Act.
3. Id.
4. Rapacz v. Township High School Dist. No. 207, 2 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 278
N.E.2d 540 (1971); Brown v. Shook, 2 Ill. App. 3d 1103, 268 N.E.2d 883 (1971);
Hoffman v. Evans, 129 Ill. App. 2d 439, 263 N.E.2d 140 (1970); Schear v. City of
Highland Park, 104 Ill. App. 2d 285, 244 N.E.2d 72 (1968).
5. 51 Ill. 2d 357, 282 N.E.2d 437 (1972).
6. Id. at 365, 282 N.E.2d at 442.
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them. 7  The net effect is that a plaintiff's ability to recover damages is di-
rectly influenced by the fortuitous event of whether the local public entity
is insured. This comment will examine the consitutionality of section 9-103
and propose alternatives to remedy the discrimination created by it.
THE SULLIVAN DECISION
In a case decided the same day as Housewright, Sullivan v. Midlothian
Park District,8 the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of sec-
tion 9-103(b). The court reviewed a circuit court finding that section 9-
103(b) was special legislation and as such violative of section 22 of article
IV of the constitution of 1870. 9
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that section 9-
103(b) discriminates against those persons injured by a local public entity,
for the reason that it makes the nature of the remedy of the per-
son. . dependent upon the unrestricted freedom of local govern-
ments to determine for themselves, whether or not, as to those im-
mune functions, they will be liable for their own negligence. 10
Without stating a reason, the Court did not respond to that argument.
Rather, it tested section 9-103(b) in light of its classification of local public
entities as insured and uninsured.
The Court did take judicial notice of the unequal treatment of injured
persons as a result of section 9-103(b). Emphasizing that the "General
7. Gowler v. City of Mt. Vernon, 7 Ill. App. 3d 466, 288 N.E.2d 80 (1972);
Crowe v. Doyle, 6 I11. App. 3d 1098, 287 N.E.2d 99 (1972).
8. 51 Ill. 2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659 (1972).
9. I11. Const. art. IV, § 22 (1870):
The general assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the follow-
ing enumerated cases, that is to say: for--Granting divorces; Changing the
names of persons or places; Laying out, opening, altering and working roads or
highways; Vacating roads, town plats, streets, alleys and public grounds;
Locating or changing county seats; Regulating county and township affairs;
Regulating the practice in courts of justice; Regulating the jurisdiction and
duties of justices of the peace, police magistrates and constables; Providing for
changes of venue in civil and criminal cases; Incorporating cities, towns or
villages, or changing or amending the charter of any town, city or village;
Providing for the election of members of the board of supervisors in town-
ships, incorporated towns or cities; Summoning and impaneling grand or petit
juries; Providing for the management of common schools; Regulating the rate
of interest on money; The opening and conducting of any election, or
designating the place of voting; The sale or mortgage of real estate belonging
to minors under disability; The protection of game fish; Chartering or
licensing ferries or toll bridges; Remitting fines, penalties or forfeitures;
Creating, increasing or decreasing fees, percentages or allowances of public
officers, during the term for which said officers are elected or appointed;
Changing the law of descent; Granting to any corporation, association or
individual the right to lay down railroad tracks, or amending existing charters
for such purposes; Granting to any corporation, association or individual any
special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever. In all other
cases where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be
enacted.
10. 51 Il1. 2d at 280, 281 N.E.2d at 663.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Assembly was aware of the history of local governmental immunity. .. "I'
and that it could have achieved complete uniformity. .. 12 if it had wanted
to, the Court stated, "We find section 9-103(b) neither arbitrary nor unrea-
sonable and hold that it does not violate section 22 of article IV."''
The Sullivan decision is somewhat of an anomaly. On the one hand it
upholds section 9-103(b) as neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, and on the
other hand, it takes judicial notice of the inequality created by the section.
It is proposed that the constitutionality of section 9-103 is not completely
settled since the Court failed to test the section's injured party classification.
"It is established that a decision sustaining the constitutionality of a statute
is not decisive of its validity against subsequent attacks upon different
grounds. .... . 14
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The 1970 Illinois constitution provides the basic framework for a con-
stitutional argument. Because most of the Illinois case law is grounded on
provisions of the constitution of 1870, a brief comparison will be made be-
tween the appropriate sections of the 1970 constitution and the parallel
provisions of the 1870 constitution.
Three sections of both constitutions are particularly apropos. The
basic right to find a remedy in the law for all injuries and wrongs is con-
tained in both article I, section 12, of the 1970 constitution and article 1U,
section 19, of the 1870 constitution.15 Article IV, section 13, of the 1970
constitution is similar to article IV, section 22, of the 1870 constitution.' 6
Both prohibit the enactment of special legislation where a general law can
be made applicable. The principal change effected by the 1970 provision
"is that it specifically rejects the rule enunciated in a long line of decisions of
this court that whether a general law can be made applicable is for the legis-
lature to determine."'1 7  In short, the responsibility for determining whether
a general law can be made applicable is with the courts.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 280-81, 281 N.E.2d at 663-64.
13. Id.
14. Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179, 184, 106 N.E.2d 124, 127
(1952).
15. Ill. Const. art. I, § 12: Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws
for all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property, or
reputation. He shall obtain justice by law, freely, completely, and promptly. Ill.
Const. art. II, § 19 (1870): Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the laws
for all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or reputation;
he ought to obtain, by law, right and justice freely, and without being obliged to pur-
chase it, completely and without denial, promptly, and without delay.
16. Ill. Const. art. IV, § 13: The General Assembly shall pass no special or local
law when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or
can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination. See Ill. Const.
art. IV, § 22 (1870) note 9 supra.
17. Bridgewater v. Hotz, 51 111. 2d 103, 110, 281 N.E.2d 317, 321 (1972).
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Article I, section 2, of the 1970 constitution and article II, section 2, of
the 1870 constitution both contain a due process clause.' For the first time,
the 1970 provision includes an equal protection clause. Although article I,
section 2 and article IV, section 13 of the 1970 constitution are not dupli-
cates, "In many cases the protection provided by Section 13 is also provided
by the equal protection clause of Article I, section 2."' 9  Together, these
provisions proscribe the constitutional standards against which the injured
party classification of section 9-103 must be tested.
The tests of special legislation, due process, and equal protection,
though distinct, all involve common inquiries. A statute does not violate the
constitutional proscription of article IV, section 13, against special legisla-
tion, "if there is a reasonable basis for the classification and it bears a rea-
sonable and proper relation to the purposes of the act and the evil it seeks to
remedy."'20 Recognizing that "the guaranty of equal protection of the laws
goes beyond the requirements of due process. ..,,21 the Illinois Supreme
Court in Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co. 2 2 stated a general test:
[To] be deemed constitutional . . . it must appear that the par-
ticular classification is based upon some real and substantial differ-
ence in kind, situation or circumstance in the persons or objects on
which the classification rests, and which bears a rational relation
to the evil to be remedied and the purpose to be attained by the
statute.
23
To determine the constitutionality of section 9-103(b), one must nec-
essarily analyze the purposes of the Act, the basis for the classification of in-
jured persons by section 9-103(b), and the relationship of the classifications
to the purposes of the Act.
ANALYSIS OF SECTION 9-103
The first inquiry is what is the purpose of the Tort Immunity Act? By
its holding in Moliter v. Kaneland Community Unit School Dist. No. 302.,24
the Illinois Supreme Court abolished local governmental immunity. Re-
sponding immediately to the Moliter decision, the General Assembly en-
acted a series of stopgap statutes in an attempt to reinstate the immunity
doctrine. Most of these statutes proved to be constitutionally defective. 25
18. Ill. Const. art. I, § 2: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws. Ill.
Const. art. II, § 2 (1870): No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
19. Ill. Const. art. IV, § 13.
20. 51 Ill. 2d at 111, 281 N.E.2d at 322.
21. Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Co., 412 Ill. 179, 194, 106 N.E.2d 124, 132
(1952).
22. 412 I11. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952).
23. ld. at 193-94, 106 N.E.2d at 132.
24. 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
25. Treece v. Shawnee Community Unit School Dist. No. 84, 39 Ill. 2d 136, 233
N.E.2d 549 (1968); Lorton v. Brown County Community Unit School Dist. No. 1,
NOTES AND COMMENTS
With the purpose of providing a comprehensive plan for administering
local governmental immunity, the General Assembly enacted the Tort Im-
munity Act. The Act adopts the rule, enunciated in Moliter, that a public
entity is liable for its negligent acts but, catalogs specific exceptions to the
rule.
Secondly, the purpose of the section 9-103(b) classifications must be
ascertained. Section 9-103(a) is an insurance authorization provision. Sec-
tion 9-103(b) states a condition that must be included in every policy issued
to a local public entity. As a result, local public entities are classified as in-
sured or uninsured, and those persons injured by local public entities are
also classified. As previously mentioned, the classification of local public
entities was held constitutional in Sullivan since it applies equally to all lo-
cal public entities. The classification of injured persons by section 9-103
(b) has not been tested constitutionally.
At the time section 9-103(b) was adopted, there was no recognizable
purpose for the classification of injured persons. In no way does such a
classification contribute to the administration of local governmental tort im-
munity. In fact, it is unlikely that the legislature intended the classification
to arise. This issue was not raised prior to Housewright because under prior
appellate court interpretation of section 9-103(b), all injured persons were
treated equally. 26 The Housewright decision has resulted in this unequal
treatment of injured persons.
The section seems to have been inspired by the holding in Thomas v.
Broadlands Consolidated School Dist.,27 wherein a school district's immunity
was waived to the extent of the amount of liability insurance which it car-
ried. This holding was criticized in Moliter28 and is contrary to the prevail-
ing view in many other jurisdictions that a governmental entity's immunity
from tort liability is unaffected by its procurement of liability insurance. 29
Third, the injured party classification of section 9-103(b) must be ex-
amined to determine if it bears a reasonable relation to the purposes of the
Act. The question raised is, whether the comprehensive administration of
tort immunity is aided by limiting the recovery of those persons injured by
an uninsured public entity, while no limits are imposed upon a person in-
jured by an insured public entity?
A similar classification was struck down in Grasse v. Dealer's Transport
Co0.3  Involved was the first paragraph of section 29 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act which limited the recovery of injured parties to those
35 Il. 2d 362, 220 N.E.2d 161 (1966); Hutchings v. Kraject, 34 Ill. 2d 379, 214 N.E.2d
274 (1966); Harvey v. Clyde Park Dist., 32 II. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964).
26. Cases cited note 4 supra.
27. 348 Il1. App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (1952).
28. 18 Il. 2d at 22, 163 N.E.2d at 94.
29. 68 A.L.R.2d 1439 (1959).
30. 412 IIl. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124 (1952).
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third party tort-feasors not covered by the Act. The court stated, "it is ap-
parent that in ascertaining the constitutionality of a statute the court is con-
cerned with its practical operation, and its natural and reasonable effect on
the rights involved.' 31 Focusing on the rights of the injured party the court
noted, "[t]he sole basis for differentiation as far as the injured employee is
concerned, is a fortuitous circumstance, whether the third party tort-feasor
happens to be under the Act."'3 2  Similarly, under section 9-103(b) the in-
jured party will have to differentiate between those public entities that are
insured and those that are uninsured. The ability to recover damages is
directly influenced by the status of the public entity.
Another classification similar to section 9-103(b) was involved in the
Moliter case.88 In fact, the language of the school code provision there at is-
sue is strikingly similar to section 9-103(b). 4 According to the school code,
a person injured by an insured school bus could recover to the extent of
such insurance, while a person injured by an uninsured school bus could re-
cover nothing at all. The court in Moliter recognized the inherent discrimi-
nation in the provision,
The difficulty with this legislative effort to curtail the judicial doc-
trine is that it allows each school district to determine for itself
whether, and to what extent, it will be financially responsible for
the wrongs inflicted by it.3
5
The same infirmity is present in section 9-103(b). It is conceded that the
classification of section 9-103(b) is distinguishable from the Grasse and
Moliter cases, since recovery is not completely cut off in every case when a
person is injured by an uninsured local entity. However, in cases where
recovery is not completely cut off, it is sharply curtailed."6
Another statute creating a classification analogous to the classification
in section 9-103(b) was held unconstitutional in Harvey v. Clyde Park
Dist.a7 The statute granted park districts immunity from suit for their neg-
ligent acts. The court recognized the classification of injured persons by
the statute:
Far more is involved here than just the classification of govern-
mental units. Those persons who are injured by the negligence of
particular governmental units are also classified .... 3s
Holding the statute arbitrary and unreasonable, the court emphasized "[i]n
this pattern there is no discernible relationship to the realities of life."
3 9
31. Id. at 193, 106 N.E.2d at 132.
32. Id. at 196, 106 N.E.2d at 133.
33. 18 Ill. 2d at 11, 163 N.E.2d at 89.
34. Id. at 17-18, 163 N.E.2d at 92.
35. Id.
36. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 85, articles II, HI, VIII (1971).
37. 32 Ill. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 573 (1964).
38. Id. at 65, 203 N.E.2d at 576.
39. Id. at 67, 203 N.E.2d at 577.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Although the foregoing decisions are all distinguishable from section
9-103(b), their rationale is undeniably appropriate and applicable to the
discriminatory classification of injured persons by section 9-103(b). The
purpose of the Act is to provide a plan for administering local governmental
tort immunity. According to Housewright, Section 9-103(b) operates as a
waiver of a local public entity's defenses and immunities when it purchases
liability insurance. As a consequence those persons injured by an uninsured
local public entity are discriminated against. Following the rationale of
Grasse, Moliter, and Harvey, the classification of injured persons is arbitrary
and unrelated to the purposes of the Tort Immunity Act. Therefore, section
9-103 section 9-103 should be amended to conform to the mandates of the
Illinois-constitution. 4
0
PROPOSALS FOR AMENDING SECTION 9-103
The Illinois Supreme Court in the Sullivan decision noted there were
possible alternatives to the present form of section 9-103(b). The dis-
criminatory effect of the section can be alleviated and uniform treatment of
injured persons can be achieved if one of the following proposals is adopted:
(1) amend section 9-103 by repealing subsection (b); or (2) amend sec-
tion 9-103 by requiring mandatory liability insurance and repealing subsec-
tion (b); or (3) repeal the Tort Immunity Act and require mandatory lia-
bility insurance for all local public entities.
The problem with the wording of section 9-103(b) was recognized
when the Act was first drafted, and alternatives were suggested. 4 1 However,
as discussed earlier, the section did not pose constitutional problems until
the Housewright decision.
All three proposals would classify local public entities and persons in-
jured by them in a non-discriminatory manner. The first proposal follows
the legislative plan adopted in the California Torts Claims Act of 1963,42
which served as the model for the Illinois Act.4 3  Flexibility is present in
this alternative; a local public entity can either insure against liability or rely
on one of the provisions in the Act to pay for damages incurred. The de-
fenses and immunities present in the Act would remain intact for all local
public entities.
The second proposal is slightly more drastic. By repealing subsection
(b) of section 9-103 and requiring mandatory insurance, the proposal de-
mands more local governmental responsibility for torious conduct. It still
allows for the statutory defenses and immunities while providing injured
40. II. Const. art. I, § 12; Il1. Const. art. IV, § 13; and Ill. Const. art. I, § 2.
41. See, Comment, Illinois Tort Claims Act: A New Approach To Municipal
Tort Immunity in Illinois, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 265, 274-75 (1966).
42. Cal. Gov't Code § 991.2 (West 1966).
43. 4 Illinois Law § 40-72 (1971).
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persons with a uniform opportunity to recover damages, regardless of which
local public entity is the tort-feasor.
The third proposal is the most drastic. Local public entities would
have the same status as any private citizen or corporation, and would be lia-
ble for their negligent acts. In addition, mandatory insurance would provide
a uniform opportunity to recover damages once liability is proved. As the
duty concept of negligence is expanded, this proposal becomes more palata-
ble. At this time, however, it is unlikely that the General Assembly will
move in this direction.
CONCLUSION
Although the doctrine of local governmental immunity has been criti-
cized in many jurisdictions, it is apparent that many of the activities en-
gaged in by local public entities, having no counterparts in private society,
require a separate system of public tort liability administration." Structured
on functional distinctions, the Tort Immunity Act provides such a system for
administering liability in Illinois. Under its present interpretation, section
9-103(b) is inconsistent with the purposes of the Act and fosters govern-
mental irresponsibility. It allows a local public entity to determine for it-
self whether or not it will waive the defenses and immunities provided in the
entity, the section is illogical, arbitrary, and most importantly, unconstitu-
tionally discriminatory. Therefore, the General Assembly should act imme-
diately to correct the injustices created by section 9-103(b).
RALPH C. SPOONER
44. See, Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Decade of Change, 1966 Law
Forum 920 (1966).
